The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy–preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction–a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions–may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical. Howe...

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a significant branch of the ongoing advances in the Internet and mobile communications. The use of a large number of IoT devices makes the spectrum scarcity problem even more serious. The usable spectrum resources are almost entirely occupied, and thus, the increasing radio access demands of IoT devices cannot be met. To tackle this problem, the Cognitive Interne...

Cognitive radio is an emerging technique to improve the utilization of radio frequency spectrum in wireless communication networks. That is, spectrum efficiency can be increased significantly by giving opportunistic access of the frequency bands to a group of cognitive users to whom the band has not been licensed. In this paper, as a cross layer application (MAC and physical layers) of graph th...

Title of dissertation: GAME-THEORETIC STRATEGIES FOR DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS Yongle Wu, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 Dissertation directed by: Professor K. J. Ray Liu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Cognitive radio technology is a new revolutionary communication paradigm which allows flexible access to spectrum resources and leads to efficient spectrum shari...

This paper considers the possibility of playing collusive strategies in customer order auctions in the Trading Agent Competition’s Supply Chain Management game. In the first half, it describes the structure of the auctions and how agents should consider their valuations of the outcomes. In the second half, it describes ways of colluding based on strategies used in the FCC spectrum auction.

We present a game theoretic approach to a resource allocation problem motivated by a concept of Open Spectrum Access. After setting up requirements of fairness and eeciency, we design an auction mechanism whose outcome (the Nash equilibrium)satisiies the speciications, under certain straightforward assumptions on players' characteristics. The mechanism is implemented as a multiplayer interactiv...

FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it to the 1995–1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders cannot exchange licenses in a way that incre...