I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition, where each firm chooses a market alternative as well as a costless “marketing message”. Consumers follow a frame-dependent choice function, where the frame is a probabilistic function of the firms’ marketing messages. This framework embeds several recent models in the literature on markets with boundedly rational consumers. ...

Household Interaction and the Labor Supply of Married Women Changing social norms, as reflected in the interactions between spouses, are hypothesized to affect the employment rates of married women. A model is built in order to estimate this effect, in which the employment of married men and women is the outcome of an internal household game. The type of the household game is exogenously determ...

We construct a general equilibrium trade model of a two-class small open host or source country. When consumption tax revenue finances the provision of a public good, marginal migration reduces social welfare in the source country and raises it in the host. When consumption tax revenue is equally distributed among domestic households in each country, then migration has an ambiguous impact on so...

We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [14]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its production function defines the utility generated from any actual set of recruited workers. We define two natural classes of production functions for firms, where...

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium de…nitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of de…nitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are po...

Investment in defense by all agents is a socially optimum equilibrium in many interdependent security scenarios. However, practically, some agents might still choose not to invest in security due to bounded rationality and errors, thus decreasing the total social welfare. Previous work shows that providing subsidies may help induce more agents to invest. Our study suggests that giving subsidies...

Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin allowing a MPE in mixed strategies. When the leader meets follower i in state m, she makes an offer p(m) with probability γm ∈ [0, 1]. The follower accepts the offer with probability αm ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the follower i meeting the leader in state m accepts only if δwout(m−1)+p(m) ≥ δw(m), and accepts with probability one if this inequality holds strictly. No...

In this paper we introduce harmonic analysis (Fourier series) as a tool for characterizing the existence of Nash equilibria in two-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games with large electorates. We apply our methods both to traditional proximity models and to directional models. In the latter voters exhibit preferences over directions rather than over alternatives, per se. A directional ...

We introduce a new mean field kinetic model for systems of rational agents interacting in a game-theoretical framework. This model is inspired from noncooperative anonymous games with a continuum of players and Mean-Field Games. The large time behavior of the system is given by a macroscopic closure with a Nash equilibrium serving as the local thermodynamic equilibrium. An application of the pr...

In social or organizational networks, it is often observed that different individuals put different levels of production effort depending on their position in the network. One possible reason is reward sharing, which incentivizes particular agents to spend effort in sharing information with others and increasing their productivity. We model the effort level in a network as a strategic decision ...