We study a very general class of games — multi-dimensional aggregative games — which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large (meaning that the influence that any single player’s action has on the utility of others is diminishing with the number of players in the game), we solve the equilibrium selection problem in a stron...

Wemodel a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination game for which approximate Nash equilibrium play does emerge. Important conditions include that players imitate ‘similar’ individuals. The role of i...

in recent years, use of fuzzy collection theories for modeling of hydrological phenomenon's that is including complexity and uncertainly is considered scholars. so in this research, adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (anfis) is used for performance of river flow forecasting process. in this research, three parameters such as raining, temperature and daily discharge of lighvanchai basin ...

The capacity allocation problem in a network that is to be shared by noncooperative users is considered. Each user decides independently upon its routing strategy so as to optimize its individual performance objective. The operating points of the network are the Nash equilibria of the underlying routing game. The network designer aims to allocate link capacities, so that the resulting Nash equi...

| The capacity allocation problem in a network that is to be shared by noncooperative users is considered. Each user decides independently upon its routing strategy, so as to optimize its individual performance objective. The operating points of the network are the Nash equilibria of the underlying routing game. The network designer aims to allocate link capacities, so that the resulting Nash e...

Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. Opponent to the attackers is the system protector scanning and cleaning from attackers some part of the network (e.g., an edge or a path), which it chooses independently using another probability distribution. Each att...