A price reveal auction is a Dutch auction in which the current price of the item on sale remains hidden. Bidders can privately observe the price only by paying a fee, and every time a bidder does so, the price falls by a predetermined amount. We show that in equilibrium, no rational bidder should enter into such an auction. Contrary to this prediction, data about actual price reveal auctions ru...

This paper examines the first 16 months of competition in the German market for long-distance voice telephony on the fixed network. It concentrates on price level and price structure. Competition induced by the entry of both network operators and switch-based service providers decreased the price level substantially. Furthermore, after initial attempts to design innovative price structures, mos...

I show that the cross-sectional standard deviation of individual price changes in the BLS CPI database is countercyclical and comoves strongly with the frequency of price adjustments. Standard Ss models with only …rst moment shocks cannot explain these facts. Adding a second moment (‘uncertainty’) shock improves the model …t signi…cantly. Furthermore, it implies a strongly procyclical sensitivi...

In this paper, collusive price leadership in homogeneous good capacity-constrained repeated price competition is examined. In the stage game, firms choose their timing of price setting. Although setting a price early is disadvantageous per se, a large firm has an incentive to move early in order to demonstrate its commitment not to deviate. If the discount factor is not too large, this behavior...

In this paper we propose a jump-diffusion type model which recovers the main characteristics of electricity spot price dynamics in the Nordic market, including seasonality, mean-reversion and spiky behavior. We show how the calibration of the market price of risk to actively traded futures contracts allows for efficient valuation of Nord Pool's Asian-style options written on the spot electricit...

This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values, where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown. In our experimental setting, in first price auctions, bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity. This result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes. We ...

This article studies U.S. monthly inflation, inflation growth, and price level dynamics from January 1967 to September 2005. Two rolling samples are constructed to recover evidence about instability in inflation, inflation growth, and price level persistence and volatility. Evidence is presented that changes in inflation, inflation growth, and price level persistence and volatility coincide wit...

We derive the optimal crowdfunding contract of a financially constrained monopolist and analyze its implications for production, investment and welfare. Crowdfunding contracts may serve as a price-discrimination mechanism, forcing pivotal consumers to pay a premium above the future spot price, thus increasing profits. When raising funds is costly, entrepreneurs balance the benefits from price d...