In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product’s revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters determi...

This paper considers a call center outsourcing contract design and choice problem, faced by an outsourcing vendor and a service provider. The service provider receives an uncertain call volume over multiple-periods, and is considering outsourcing all or part of these calls to an outsourcing vendor. Each call brings in a fixed revenue to the service provider. Answering calls requires having serv...

This paper mainly proposes a coordination mechanism for supply chain system containing multiple retailers and one supplier. According to the proposed mechanism, lateral transshipments are performed among while revenue-sharing contract is used allocate revenue caused by transshipment. Meanwhile, buy-back coordinate retailer We use with supplier two as an example demonstrate effectiveness of mech...

This paper considers a call center outsourcing contract analysis and choice problem, faced by a contractor and a service provider. The service provider receives an uncertain call volume over multiple-periods, and is considering outsourcing all or part of these calls to a contractor. Each call brings in a fixed revenue to the service provider. Answering calls requires having service capacity, th...

This study investigates recent determinants of revenue in North America’s four major professional sports leagues. Estimates reveal that revenue is positively associated with winning in baseball (MLB), basketball (NBA), and hockey (NHL), but not in football (NFL). The returns to winning are not diminishing as commonly assumed, which casts doubt on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, and diffe...

This paper investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for pricing and ordering decisions in a multi-channel supply chain. We study a situation where a manufacturer is going to open a direct online channel in addition to n existing traditional retail channels. It is assumed that the manufacturer is the leader and the retailers are the followers. The situation has a hierarchical nature and...

This paper contributes to the supply chain contracts literature in economics and operations by performing qualitative sensitivity analysis of a wholesale price contract in a two-echelon supply chain setting. Ordertheory tools are used to derive sufficient conditions for monotonicity of contract parameters. The upstream supplier is modeled as a Stackelberg leader. The supplier is assumed to have...