We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically, and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects motivated by financial incentives. We find that the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that players are per...

In this paper, we consider a recently introduced cybersecurity investment supply chain game theory model consisting of retailers and consumers at demand markets with the retailers being faced with nonlinear budget constraints on their cybersecurity investments. We construct a novel reformulation of the derived variational inequality formulation of the governing Nash equilibrium conditions. The ...

When demand exceeds supply, retailers hedge against shortages by placing multiple orders with multiple suppliers. This artificial growth in orders can severely affect suppliers, creating excess capacity, excess inventory, low capacity utilization, financial and reputation losses. This paper contributes to the understanding of order amplification caused by shortages, by providing a comprehensive...

Retail customers are now omnichannel both for attitude and behaviour. Shoppers are also demanding a different and higher level of experience within retailer’s brand, channel, contact point and the way in which the retail is accessed. Such shoppers avoid retailers who are illequipped to deliver a seamless brand experience online, in-store and across multichannel media, both consistently and cont...

I many industries, Internet referral services, hosted either by independent third-party infomediaries or by manufacturers, serve as digitally enabled lead generators in electronic markets, directing consumer traffic to downstream retailers in a distribution network. This reshapes the extended enterprise from the traditional network of upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers to include m...

In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the ...

In the present competitive retailing environment, retailers are confronted with consumers who are prone to switch between online and physical retail channels as well as across retailers. This research attempts to understand the factors that influence multichannel consumer attitude to engage in switching. We propose a model based on the push-pull-mooring theory to study the impact of various det...

We consider two−echelon supply chains with one supplier and two retailers. Retailers are censored newsvendors facing general parametric demand distributions involving unknown parameters. Using a Bayesian MDP formulation, we investigate how the supplier can make use of the combined information gathered from the retailers’ sales data to increase channel pro ts. We compare among the following thre...

This paper evaluates the joint impact of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on suppliers and retailers in a hybrid duopoly common retailer and exclusive channel model. The model bridges the gap in the literature on hybrid multichannel supply chains with bilateral complementary products and services with/without revenue sharing. The analysis indicates that, without revenue sharing, the suppl...

We introduce and analyze two-period intertemporal competitive dynamic pricing models in the presence of both store-switchers and store-loyal consumers who may be either myopic or strategic. Our analysis reveals that (i) in the presence of storeswitching consumers, retailers’ profits may increase with an increase in the patience level of the strategic consumers, which never happens when consumer...