Abstract This article considers the ways in which partisanship structured public attitudes about United States’ multiple governments as each tried to mitigate spread of COVID-19 during spring and summer 2020. The evidence shows that Democrats Republicans both made distinctions among their local, state, federal governments, assigning them different functional responsibilities. Yet, members two p...

This paper focuses on the accountability of disaster preparedness and response two cities in Metro Manila, Philippines. The draws a lesson from experiences highly urbanized Manila how coordinated efforts among members City Disaster Risk Reduction Management Councils (CDRRMC) were accounted for. provides deeper understanding city governments fulfill their commitments responsibilities to victims ...

This paper investigates the use of high-level action languages for representing and reasoning about commitments in multiagent domains. The paper introduces the language Lmt with features motivated by the problem of representing commitments; in particular, it shows how Lmt can handle both simple commitment actions and complex commitment protocols. The semantics ofLmt provides a uniform solution ...

The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. shows that the relative timing of rewards and costs will determine whether players’ present-bias affect outcomes. In cases where agree to a bargain in period 1 experience all payoffs 2, act time-consistent fashion. When time-inconsistent incur immediate produce delayed rewards, they have an incentive procrasti...

Commitments are crucial to understanding and designing autonomous agents and multiagent systems. We propose a deenition of commitments that applies especially well to agents in information-rich applications, such as electronic commerce and virtual enterprises. Our approach has a number of important features, including { not gratuitously translating social concepts to psychological concepts { di...

We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not affect efficiency. We find that accurate commitments promote efficiency, as expected ...