The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then exten...

Novel species are introduced into a network of interacting replicators either (i) as mutants of members of the network or (ii) as unrelated immigrants. We consider the meta-population dynamics of such a system. In the rst case the appearance of mutants leads to a slow growth of the replicator network, proportional to the logarithm of the number of mutation events. Surprisingly, replicator evolv...

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has become increasingly used for studying functional integration of the brain. However, the large inter-subject variability in functional connectivity renders detection of representative group networks very difficult. In this paper, we propose a new iterative method that we refer to as "group replicator dynamics," for detecting sparse functional netw...

We compare the explanatory power of two popular adjustment models, replicator dynamics and simple belief learning dynamics. The data, gathered over 18 laboratory sessions each with 8 to 16 profit-motivated players, comprise more than 100 runs (each with 10 or more stages or periods) of single and two population 2 2 bimatrix games with unique interior equilibria. To equalize the number of free p...

We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior st...

Quadratic optimization lies at the very heart of many structural pattern recognition and computer vision problems, such as graph matching, object recognition, image segmentation, etc., and it is therefore of crucial importance to devise algorithmic solutions that are both efficient and effective. As it turns out, a large class of quadratic optimization problems can be formulated in terms of so-...

We show on a 4 × 4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of a...