We study an online model of fair division designed to capture features of a real world charity problem. We consider two simple mechanisms for this model in which agents simply declare what items they like. We analyse axiomatic properties of these mechanisms such as strategy-proofness and envy freeness. Finally, we perform a competitive analysis and compute the price of anarchy.

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality. Since domain is not connected, famous characterization of Vickrey rule in terms three properties Holmstrom (1979) cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on domain, still only

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on mergingand splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. JEL classification: C71, D23, D71.

In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear preferences. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked pre...

A common challenge in distributed work systems like P2P file-sharing communities, or ad-hoc routing networks, is to minimize the number of free-riders and incentivize contributions. Without any centralized monitoring it is difficult to distinguish contributors from free-riders. One way to address this problem is via accounting mechanisms which rely on voluntary reports by individual agents and ...

We introduce a new cooperative stability concept, absence-proofness (AP). Given an allocation problem in a society , and a solution well defined for all subsocieties, a group of people may benefit by leaving a subgroup “out” of the allocation process. After the allocation takes place in the society , agents in may reallocate what they received, plus ’s endowments (if they have any) among all of...

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.