Axelrod’s originally experiments for evolving IPD player strategies involved the use of a basic GA. In this paper we examine how well a simple GA performs against the more recent Population Based Incremental Learning system under similar conditions. We find that while PBIL performs well, GA in general does slightly better although more experiments should be conducted.

We examine an n-player prisoners’ dilemma game in which only individual deviations are allowed, while coalitional deviations (even non-binding ones) are not, and every player is assumed to be farsighted enough to understand not only the direct outcome of his own deviation, but also the ultimate outcome resulting from a chain of subsequent deviations by other players. By constructing a purely no...

A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner's dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been determined numerically. Spatially, the critical states are characterized by the existence of delicatel...

In this paper we study info-gap analogs of the classical game-theoretic concepts of informationand knowledge-functions, common knowledge and consensus. Our main results are that knowledge is constricted as info-gap-uncertainty grows (theorem 1), common knowledge is limited by the presence of info-gap uncertainty (theorem 2), and that common knowledge is related to consensus via the infogap cohe...

This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. We find that subjects’ payoffs (i) decrease as noise increases, and (ii) are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise, but exceed it for high noise. Under the ass...

This paper introduces a simple model of interacting agents that learn to predict each other. For learning to predict the other’s intended action we apply genetic programming. The strategy of an agent is rational and fixed. It does not change like in classical iterated prisoners dilemma models. Furthermore the number of actions an agent can choose from is infinite. Preliminary simulation results...

This paper extends the belief-based approach to repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We rst nd that the previous belief-based techniques (Sekiguchi (1997), Bhaskar and Obara (2002)) cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are su ciently di erent. We then modify the previous belief-based approach by letting the player with smaller observation error...

This supplement contains extended formal results for Daley and Sadowski (2016) (henceforth DS16). Specifically, §S.1 establishes that in Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) games, the model of DS16 is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 19...

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences—inequality aversion—using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners’ dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subjec...

In this paper, we study the practice of overselling in a competitive environment where late arriving consumers value the good higher than early arriving ones but the former’s arrival is uncertain. We show that overselling is a dominant strategy for the firms. However, it can lead to a prisoners’ dilemma situation in which all firms are worse off overselling. We further show that only when deman...