This paper describes an algorithm to find an (a-)envy-free Pareto-optimal division in the case of a finite number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods and linear utility functions. It is used to find an allocation in the classical cake division problem that is almost Pareto-op timat and o-envy-free. 9 1998 The Mathematical Pregraming, Society, Inc. Published by Elsevier Science B.V_

The role of self-evaluation and envy in schadenfreude Wilco W. van Dijk, Jaap W. Ouwerkerk, Richard H. Smith & Mina Cikara To cite this article: Wilco W. van Dijk, Jaap W. Ouwerkerk, Richard H. Smith & Mina Cikara (2015) The role of self-evaluation and envy in schadenfreude, European Review of Social Psychology, 26:1, 247-282 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2015.1111600

Dominant psychoanalytic paradigms locate the breast or penis/phallus as the touchstone for gender/sex/sexual development. This essay offers a critique of these accounts and an alternative theory of sexed forms of being: pregnancy envy and the kinship rules that result from this. The essay also provides an intellectual history of how previous efforts to theorize pregnancy envy, especially work b...

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

We study a fair resource sharing problem, where set of resources are to be shared among group agents. Each agent demands one and each can serve limited number An cares about what they get as well the externalities imposed by their mates, who share same with them. Clearly, strong notion envy-freeness, no envies another for or cannot always achieved we show that even deciding existence such stron...

Chore division, introduced by Gardner in 1970s [10], is the problem of fairly dividing a chore among n different agents. In particular, in an envy-free chore division, we would like to divide a negatively valued heterogeneous object among a number of agents who have different valuations for different parts of the object, such that no agent envies another agent. It is the dual variant of the cel...

While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not incentivized. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with multiple agents. Envious agents suffer if other agents receive a higher wage due to random shocks to their performance measures. The necessary compensation f...