Russellian physicalism is a view on the nature of consciousness which promises to satisfy demands both traditional physicalists and non-physicalists. It does so by identifying subjective experience with physically acceptable categorical properties underlying structural dispositional described science. Though promising, faces at least two serious challenges: (i) it has been argued that science d...

This paper is trying to show that it is not possible to use the Knowledge argument as independent evidence for the form of non-reductionism the Modal argument argues for. To show this, Jackson's famous 'Mary' thought experiment is imagined in a zombie world. This leads to the result that there are many problems in the Mary experiment, which cannot have anything to do with phenomenal Qualia, bec...

Descartes has confronted science with a hard problem: the mind-body or, in modern terms, the consciousness-matter problem. According to the current state of modern theoretical physics { which is, basically, quantum physics { the question arises if we really should expect to solve the problems of mind independently of the problems of matter. Strangely enough, modern philosophy of mind deals exte...

Many computational modeling approaches of the mind seem to be characterized by an implicit strong physicalism, which frequently leads to confusion in philosophy of AI. This work aims at pointing out some fundamental aspects of this problem, both with respect to the relation between epistemological computationalism and physical realization, and the view of symbol manipulation as constrained comp...

It may be that qualia are neither a uniquely hard problem that physicalism can only resolve by treating them as fundamental properties as Chalmers has suggested in some of his writings (1995, 1996, 2003), nor so ephemeral that they will disappear entirely once Science has solved all of the easy problems associated with the brain as Dennett has proposed in some of his (1988, 1991). It could be t...

Consider three answers to the question of what it actually is for you to be aware of the room you are in. (1) It is for the room in a way to exist. (2) It is for there to be only physical activity in your head, however additionally described. (3) It is for there to be non-spatial facts somehow in your head. The first theory, unlike the other two, satisfies five criteria for an adequate account ...

In “The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism,” Peter Ross argues against what he calls subjectivism — the view that “colors are not describable in physical terms, ... [but are] mental processes or events of visual states” (2), and in favor of physicalism — a view according to which colors are “physical properties of physical objects, such as reflectance properties” (10). He rejects an argume...