We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with somemodifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsisten...

a r t i c l e i n f o This paper quantitatively characterizes optimal linear and two-bracket income taxes. We consider a dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium model in which tax design involves redistributing income for both equity and social insurance. Substantive findings include: (i) a significant fraction of agents supply zero labor or hold zero assets at the optimum; (ii) neglecting tax d...

In many OECD countries, statutory corporate tax rates are lower than personal income tax rates. The present paper argues that this tax rate differentiation is an optimal tax policy if there are problems of asymmetric information between investors and firms in the capital market. The reduction of the corporate tax rate below the personal tax rate encourages equity financing and thus mitigates th...

This paper characterizes the optimal linear financial transaction tax in an equilibrium model of competitive financial markets. As long as investors hold heterogeneous beliefs about the returns of assets in fixed supply and the planner calculates welfare using any single belief, we expect the optimal tax to be positive, even when a fraction of trading is fundamental. Strikingly, the optimal tax...

Gasoline taxes can correct externalities associated with automobile use, reduce dependency on foreign oil, and raise government revenue. Our understanding of the optimal gasoline tax and the efficacy of existing taxes is largely based on empirical analysis of consumer responses to gasoline price changes. In this paper, we directly examine how gasoline taxes affect consumer behavior as distinct ...

Tax evasion is modeled as a risky activity and integrated into a standard problem of optimal tax design. It is shown that there is a trade off between reducing tax evasion and reducing tax distortion. Thus it is efficient to supplement a broad-based wage tax by a tax on specific consumption if the former is evaded and the latter not. The optimal tax structure can be characterized by an explicit...

This paper posits a two-stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property of second-best emission and output taxes in a two-country world with an atmospheric externality. It shows that (i) either the destination-destination or the origin-origin tax regime may constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game; (ii) either regime may Pareto-dominate the other; (iii) it is po...

a r t i c l e i n f o This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses ...