A copula is a useful tool for constructing bivariate and/or multivariate distributions. In this article, we consider a new modified class of FGM (Farlie–Gumbel–Morgenstern) bivariate copula for constructing several different bivariate Kumaraswamy type copulas and discuss their structural properties, including dependence structures. It is established that construction of bivariate distributions ...

In this paper we study the asymptotic behavior of the tail probabilities of sums of dependent and real-valued random variables whose distributions are assumed to be subexponential and not necessarily of dominated variation. We propose two general dependence assumptions under which the asymptotic behavior of the tail probabilities of the sums is the same as that in the independent case. In parti...

A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of cont...

Since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), expected utility theory has been the dominant framework for analyzing decision making under uncertainty. Consequently, Borch (1960) also assumed in his pioneering paper on efficient risksharing that all individuals are expected utility maximizers. Since the work of Borch (1960), efficient risk-sharing has been extensively treated in the expe...

The paper introduces a new notion of risk aversion that is independent of the good under observation and its measure scale. The representational framework builds on a time consistent combination of additive separability on certain consumption paths and the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) assumptions. In the one-commodity special case, the new notion of risk aversion closely relates to a disent...

The Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional. We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU "non-equivalent utilities". The condition is weak, easily interpreted, ...

An extension of Von Neumann Morgenstern solution theory to cooperative games without side payments has been outlined in [1]. In this paper we revise some of the definitions given in [1] and prove that in the new theory every threeperson constant sum game is solvable (see [1, Theorem 1]). Other results that were formulated in [1] had already been proved in [2]. [1 ; 2] are also necessary for a f...

This chapter of a collective book aims at presenting the basics of decision making under risk. We ...rst de...ne notions of risk and increasing risk and recall de...nitions and classi...cations (that are valid independently of any representation) of behavior under risk. We then review the classical model of expected utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern and its main properties. Issues rais...

This chapter of a collective book aims at presenting the basics of decision making under risk. We ...rst de...ne notions of risk and increasing risk and recall de...nitions and classi...cations (that are valid independently of any representation) of behavior under risk. We then review the classical model of expected utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern and its main properties. Issues rais...