Given two finite ordered sets A = {a1, . . . , am} and B = {b1, . . . , bn}, introduce the set of mn outcomes of the game O = {(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈ B} = {(ai, bj) | i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ J = {1, . . . , n}. Two players, Alice and Bob, have the sets of strategies X and Y that consist of all monotone non-decreasing mappings x : A → B and y : B → A, respectively. It is easily seen that each pa...

This article presents the evaluation process for the ZIG-ZAIDS game, i n vestigating the m a t e r i a l ’s applicability in formal and informal educational contex t s , i . e . , h ow the game has been used by health pro f e s s i o n a l s , p a re n t s , and the target population (pre a d o l e s c e n t s , or child ren over 9 years old). The study invo l ved evaluation questionnaires sent...

In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...

We prove new theoretical results about several variations of the cop and robber game on graphs. First, we consider a variation of the cop and robber game which is more symmetric called the cop and killer game. We prove for all c < 1 that almost all random graphs are stalemate for the cop and killer game, where each edge occurs with probability p such that 1 nc ≤ p ≤ 1 − 1 nc . We prove that a g...

Sponsored search advertising (SSA), the primary revenue source of Web search engine companies, has become the dominant form of online advertising. Search engine companies, such as Google and Baidu, are naturally interested in SSA mechanism design with the aim to improve the overall effectiveness and profitability of SSA ecosystems. Due to model intractability, however, traditional game theory a...

Ordinary Kripke models are not reactive. When we evaluate (test/measure) a formula A at a model m, the model does not react, respond or change while we evaluate. The model is static and unchanged. This paper studies Kripke models which react to the evaluation process and change themselves during the process. This is reminiscent of game theoretic semantics where the two sides react to each other...

s of the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory and Applications SEVILLA, 2002 J. M. BILBAO F.R. FERNÁNDEZ

objective: to classify different types of acute leukemia based on cooperative game theory and shapley value. materials and methods: in this study, patients data were collected from flow cytometry tests of the iran blood transfusion organization (ibto) have been used. 304 different diagnosed samples in 8 classes of acute leukemia were investigated. samples were initially in numerical format. i...

We consider the problem of distributed channel allocation in large networks under the frequency-selective interference channel. Our goal is to design a utility function for a non-cooperative game such that all of its pure Nash equilibria have close to optimal global performance. Performance is measured by the weighted sum of achievable rates. Such a game formulation is very attractive as a basi...