The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can be applied to uniquely select any competitive equilibrium with suitable default penalties. We identify two classes of such economies.

Empirical ethics is based upon the idea that empirical research can be used to develop new and better ethical theories. Empirical research can elucidate the relevance of ethical issues in daily life, and show which problems require normative analysis. It can also give insight into the considerations of practitioners, which might be morally relevant because they embody experience. In the literat...

The author still worries, however, that the student is memorizing the equilibrium condition, IS=LM generates Ye, without really understanding why the condition works. Most students are unable to explain why setting IS equal to LM generates the equilibrium level of output. I have, on rare occasion, heard a student give the following explanation: "Along the IS curve the goods market is in equilib...

We use simple analytic arguments and lattice-based computer simulations to study the growth of structures made from a large number of distinct component types. Components possess 'designed' interactions, chosen to stabilize an equilibrium target structure in which each component type has a defined spatial position, as well as 'undesigned' interactions that allow components to bind in a composit...

What are the sources of phenotypic variation and which factors shape this variation are fundamental questions of developmental and evolutionary biology. Despite this simple formulation and intense research, controversy remains. Three points are particularly discussed: (1) whether adaptive developmental mechanisms buffering variation exist at all; (2) if yes, do they involve specific genes and p...

This paper shows how to characterize the set of outcomes functions that can be supported as equilibrium outcome functions in competing mechanism games. We describe a set of mechanisms we refer to as reciprocal mechanisms. It is show that the set of outcome functions supportable as equilibria in a game in which principals offer reciprocal mechanisms is the same as the set of outcomes supportable...

We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts designed to re...

The link between trade liberalization and poverty reduction has played a crucial role on economic policy in developing and least developed countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Academic research shows a remarkable lack of consensus and no clear effects in the direction of these linkages. This study presents an overview of the impact of trade liberalization on poverty in Sub-Saharan Afr...

Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin allowing a MPE in mixed strategies. When the leader meets follower i in state m, she makes an offer p(m) with probability γm ∈ [0, 1]. The follower accepts the offer with probability αm ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the follower i meeting the leader in state m accepts only if δwout(m−1)+p(m) ≥ δw(m), and accepts with probability one if this inequality holds strictly. No...

Previous papers have modelled the behaviour of populations which are subject to kleptoparasitism, and found those ecological situations in which kleptoparasitism should occur. Individuals were considered to be in one of several states, and an equilibrium distribution for the population was found. It was then assumed, for analytical purposes but without proof, that the population was actually in...