Abstract In this paper, we describe how agency frictions in asset management can generate prime violations of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, such as momentum, value and an inverted risk-return relationship. Momentum our theory is associated with procyclical fund flows price over-reaction, more pronounced for overvalued assets. The investors who momentum are losing from it those requiring the...

We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms that are approximately efficient. For deterministic mechanisms, we show that a strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanism must have a sink agent whose valuation function is...

This chapter presents motivation and definitions for quantifying the inefficiency of equilibria in noncooperative games. We illustrate the basic concepts in four fundamental network models, which are studied in depth in subsequent chapters. We also discuss how measures of the inefficiency of equilibria can guide mechanism and network design.