Experiments elicit choices from a given set of decision problems. When multiple decision problems are offered in the same experiment, however, behavior in one decision problem may be distorted by the choices made in others. In our terminology, this is a violation of incentive compatibility. We show that, when preferences respect stochastic dominance, the Random Decision Selection (RDS) mechanis...

We consider the problem of coordinating the behavior of multiple self-interested agents. It involves constraint optimization problems that often can only be solved by local search algorithms. Using local search poses problems of incentivecompatibility and individual rationality. We thus define a weaker notion of bounded-rational incentive-compatibility where manipulation is made impossible with...

We use tropical geometry to analyze finite valued mechanisms. We geometrically characterize all mechanisms on arbitrary type spaces, derive geometric and algebraic criteria for weak monotonicity, incentive compatibility and revenue equivalence. As corollaries we obtain various results known in the literature and shed new light on their nature.

This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Combinatorial auctions, in which multiple goods are sold simultaneously, have recently attracted considerable attention. The GVA can handle combinatorial auctions and has good theoretical characteristics such as incentiv...

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenu...

A social-choice function maps reports of the agents’ private information into a set of social alternatives. The (weak) expost implementation problem is to find transfers such that truthful reporting by the agents is ex-post incentive compatible. Jehiel et al. (2006) prove that in enviroments with a discrete set of social alternatives, at least two agents, multi-dimensional information and gener...

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to the design of payment rules. This computational approach to mechanism design is applicable to ...

We show that in a class of I–agent mechanism design problems with evidence, commitment has no value for the principal, randomization has no value for the principal, and robust incentive compatibility has no cost. In particular, there is an equilibrium with a relatively simple structure in which the principal obtains the same outcome without commitment as the best he can achieve with commitment.

Paper concerns to impact on custom receipts of duty rate changing from single to differentiated ones by customs house for foreign producers. To get maximal custom receipts for achieving of social goal state may introduce differentiated duty rates for foreign producers of unique product. Success of this state policy will depend on effectiveness of incentive compatibility conditions for these pro...

We model the task of interdomain routing—the task of connecting the networks that compose the Internet—as an iterative, highly distributed, asynchronous game. Unlike previous examinations of this game that assumed quasi-linear utilities, we assume that each node has a quasi-bilinear utility depending not only on the route it believes it is assigned in the outcome, but also on other nodes assign...