This is undoubtedly recognized that economic performance for each country over time is related to a great extent to its political, institutional and legal environment. In fact, these institutions and policies are that determine the governance quality.   In a panel data study, we applied newly developed indices to examine the effects of good governance on FDI for fifteen middle-income countri...

Abstract Background Domestication usually has negative effects on insect performance, especially when they are reared continuously for many generations. Rejuvenation can reduce the of domestication in parasitoid, Trichogramma brassicae Bezdenko (Hymenoptera: Trichogrammatidae) 30 generations (G) Sitotroga cerealella (Olivier) (Lepidoptera: Gelechiidae). Life table and parasitism parameters prim...

This paper examines the effect of leverage on the effectiveness of a self-financed taxsubsidy program offered by a government in stimulating a firm’s investment. We show that the firm, be it levered or unlevered, has an incentive to hasten its investment because of the agency conflicts arising from the commitment made by the government on the terms of the tax-subsidy program. We further show th...

This paper presents a theoretical model of default risk in the context of the ``market'' model approach to interest rate dynamics. We propose a model for ®nite-interval interest rates (such as LIBOR) which explicitly takes into account the possibility of default through the in ̄uence of a point process with deterministic intensity. We relate the defaultable interest rate to the non-defaultable i...

We investigate Project Finance as a private response to ine¢ ciencies created by weak legal protection of outside investors. In the context of large investment projects, Project Finance o¤ers a contractual and organizational substitute for investor protection laws by making cash ‡ows veri…able, thereby enhancing debt capacity. Project Finance makes cash ‡ows veri…able through: (i) contractual a...

We consider a dynamic model in which shareholders delegate a manager, who observes private information about running and liquidation costs of the firm, to operate the firm. We analytically derive the shareholders’ optimal contract contingent on the cost structure of the firm. The information asymmetries change the high-cost firm’s default and liquidation timing. Even if the liquidation value is...

This paper conducts a theoretical and quantitative analysis of how entrepreneurs choose firm size, capital structure, default, and owner consumption to manage firm risk, including how these choices change with risk aversion. We decompose an entrepreneur’s default decision into three elements: the fraction of firm debt; the potential reduction in personal consumption from losing the firm; and th...