are completely competitive, where whatever one player wins, the other loses. Examples of such games include chess, checkers, backgammon, etc. We will show that in such games: • An equilibrium always exists (although not necessarily a pure one); • All equilibrium points yield the same payoff for the players; • The set of equilibrium points is actually the cartesian product of independent sets of...

We suggest a explicit viscosity iterative algorithm for nding a common elementof the set of common xed points for W-mappings which solves somevariational inequality. Also, we prove a strong convergence theorem with somecontrol conditions. Finally, we apply our results to solve the equilibrium problems.Finally, examples and numerical results are also given.

The aim of this work is to describe the qualitative behavior of the solution set of a given system of fractional differential equations and limiting behavior of the dynamical system or flow defined by the system of fractional differential equations. In order to achieve this goal, it is first necessary to develop the local theory for fractional nonlinear systems. This is done by the extension of...

In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points—points below which they consider payoffs to be losses— are endogenous to the equilibrium calculation. The first type is the fixed point loss aversion equilibrium, introduced in Shalev (...

We suggest an explicit viscosity iterative algorithm for finding a common element in the set of solutions of the general equilibrium problem system (GEPS) and the set of all common fixed points of two noncommuting nonexpansive self mappings in the real Hilbert space.