Autocratic regimes, democratic majorities, private platforms, and religious or professional organizations can achieve social control by managing the flow of information about individuals’ behavior. Bundling agents’ political, organizational, attitudes with their prosocial conduct makes them care behaviors that they otherwise would not. The incorporation graph in score further promotes soft but ...

The ability to accurately assess others’ intents, beliefs, and emotions – called Theory of Mind (ToM) – is conjectured to be important for social cooperation. We study the role of ToM ability in fostering cooperation in the simultaneous and sequential prisoners dilemma (PD) games. Our norm-based model predicts that high ToM ability individuals will believe in more cooperation and cooperate at h...

We study voters’ response to marginal changes the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller has robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of lost votes are blank or invalid. also show that an exemption compulsory voting substantially larger than ful...

Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners’ dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners’ dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equili...

The ability to accurately assess others’ intents, beliefs, and emotions – called Theory of Mind (ToM) – is conjectured to be important for social cooperation. We study the role of ToM ability in fostering cooperation in the simultaneous and sequential prisoners dilemma (PD) games. Our norm-based model predicts that high ToM ability individuals will believe in more cooperation and cooperate at h...

We propose a model of political careers and electoral accountability in an environment which politicians may take bribes at different stages their politicians’ actions are only imperfectly observed by voters. show that the expectation promotion to higher office motivate some behave worse latest careers, setting off trade-off between providing incentives for good behavior lower levels selecting ...

We study the impact of strategic commitment on cooperation in indefinitely repeated games of strategic substitutes (Cournot) and complements (Bertrand) using laboratory experiments. Overall, strategic commitment has no effect on cooperation with strategic substitutes and a negative one with strategic complements. In the absence of strong strategic commitment, we find more cooperation in the com...

We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase co...

We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with homogeneous goods, where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, our main results are that (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and (iii...

Cooperation can increase the efficiency of commonly–owned renewable resource use. However, received knowledge is that, absent side payments, cooperative solutions are more difficult to achieve the less homogenous the agents involved. We revisit this claim by analyzing how differences in the opportunity costs of resource harvesting affect the scope for Pareto–improving contracts, where contracti...