This study reports on computational experiments for an agent-based labor market-model-with adaptive choice'and refusal of work site' partners and with endogenously evolving work site behaviors. Two treatment factors ^e experimentally varied: market structure; and ex ante capacity constraints on potential work offers and job openings.Particular attentions focused on experimentally determined cor...

Today, many biotechnology firms are using strategic alliances to contract with other companies. In this article, Professor Smith contends that the governance structure of these alliances—specifically, the “contractual board”—provides an integrated restraint on opportunism. While an alliance agreement’s exit structure could provide a check on opportunism by allowing the parties to exit at will, ...

?2.25 45s Philosophical discussions of responsibility , freedom of the will and such subjects seem often to stand at an enormous distance from the more immediate problems of psychiatry and the law. That they should stand at some distance is inevitable and no bad thing, but to keep them too far apart for too long has, among other bad effects, the rather paradoxical one of making both parties con...

In service industries with congestion effects, two very different contractual structures are commonly observed, depending on whether or not firms choose to offer a guaranteed service level. We analyze the impact of these choices onmarket outcomes in oligopolistic industries. Our results highlight howdifferent contractual agreements change the intensity of price competition in service industries...

Background In times of financial hardship, making innovative treatments affordable for society, accessible for patients and profitable for pharmaceutical companies is a challenge. Reimbursement is often threatened by uncertainties about the financial impact or evidence for a treatment. A contractual agreement between the payer and pharmaceutical company can link reimbursement to financial thres...

Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of bounded rationality and examines its consequences for contractual design. It is argued that cognition is a natural source of adverse selection in contractual relationships, that contracts may be...