We consider models of multi-player games where abilities of players and coalitions are defined in terms of sets of outcomes which they can effectively enforce. We extend the well studied state effectivity models of one-step games in two different ways. On the one hand, we develop multiple state effectivity functions associated with different longterm temporal operators. On the other hand, we de...

We introduce a measure for the level of stability against coalitional deviations, called stability scores, which generalizes widely used notions of stability in non-cooperative games. We use the proposed measure to compare various Nash equilibria in congestion games, and to quantify the effect of game parameters on coalitional stability. For our main results, we apply stability scores to analyz...

The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case that some players cooperatively decide on their joint action in order to maximize the coalition’s total utility. This is by modeled by Coalitional Congestio...

The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division scheme in cooperative game theory, satisfying basic axioms. However, some allocation according to may seem unfair humans. In this paper, we develop an automatic method that generates intuitive explanations for a Shapley-based payoff allocation, which utilizes Given coalitional game, our decomposes it sub-games, easy generate verb...

When resources are divided among agents, resources are in many cases divided proportionally to their claims. In this paper, we provide new axiomatizations of generalized proportional rules based on the axiom “decentralizability” due to Moulin [13,14,15]. Decentralizability requires that no reallocation by any coalition can affect the awards of the agents outside the coalition. Our results can e...

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers to bridge a gap between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. Theoretical results include the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and the characterization of the grand-coalition SSPE as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, provided that it lies in the core. We also prov...