We examine the MISO interference channel under cooperative bargaining theory. Bargaining approaches such as the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions have previously been used in wireless networks to strike a balance between max-sum efficiency and max-min equity in users’ rates. However, cooperative bargaining for the MISO interference channel has only been studied extensively for the two-user c...

Physicians play a critical role in determining medical-care expenditures. In this study, we empirically assess the degree to which physicians exploit their bargaining leverage over insurance carriers as a means to raise service prices. We also examine the degree to which these potentially higher payments may translate into different levels of service utilization. We find that physicians are abl...

We analyze the impact of entrepreneurship as an outside option on compensation contracts between a principal and an agent with bargaining power. In the first stage the parties bargain over the base wage and the profit share. In the second stage the principal determines the capital investment and the agent decides on effort. It is shown that while negotiated base wage increases in the degree of ...

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the outside option available of employees for the evaluation of the employment implications of intensified credit market competition. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining...

a r t i c l e i n f o This paper aims to study the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with codetermined firms. We show that when both firms codetermine employment together with decentralised employees' representatives, a rise in wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when the wage is fairly (high) low, while under profit maximisation a rise in wages always acts as a stabilising device becau...

This paper provides an efficient union-firm bargaining solution within the right to manage framework, by separating efficiency and distributional considerations through bargaining over wage and non-wage benefits. We show that without insurance considerations, efficiency is achieved by equating the wage and workers’ opportunity cost and providing the union with a surplus share in accordance with...

According to Gans & Stern (1999), firms engage in R&D spending, in part, in order to improve their bargaining position as buyers in the market for technology. We test this theory empirically with data from the pharmaceutical industry. We develop and estimate a structural model of R&D spending and licensing. We find that R&D spending does improve the bargaining position of licensees; although, t...

We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through collective bargaining. The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and has effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium ...

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equ ilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the outside option available of employees for the evaluation of the employment implications of intensified credit market competition. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargainin...

The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) has long been used to model wage negotiations between firms and unions examples include de Menil (1971), McDonald and Solow (1981), Nickell and Andrews (1983), Anderson and Devereux (1989), Dowrick (1989, 1990), Leslie (1990) and Hoel (1990). Much of this research has chosen quite arbitrary values for the parameters of the NBS the status-quo point and the barg...