Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols an...

This paper presents a computational model of negotiation based on Nebel’s syntax-based belief revision. The model guarantees a unique bargaining solution for each bargaining game without using lotteries. Its game-theoretic properties are discussed against the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. We also study essential computational properties in relatio...

The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold–up problem. At a first stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship– specific investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargai...

Professor Michael Maschler passed away on July 20, 2008. He belonged to the small and select group of first generation game theorists who created the discipline, by developing new frameworks of analysis, proposing original solutions and discovering new fields of application. For over fifty years he played a central role in our community, and his name is decisively associated with the developmen...

EPC (Energy Performance Contracting), as a mechanism grounded in markets, is important for the energy saving industry. The issue of energy savings benefit allocation in Shared Savings Energy Performance Contracting Projects is one obstacle frustrating the rapid growth of the energy performance contracting mechanism. Currently, studies on this issue primarily adopt the equilibrium principle of g...

In this paper, we investigate a noncooperative sequential bargaining game for allowing a group of agents agents to partition themselves into non-overlapping coalitions. We focus on the issue of how a player’s position on the bargaining agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relationship between the distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare e...

I study a bilateral bargaining game in which the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process and in which players might be optimistic about their bargaining power. Following Yildiz (2003), I model optimism by assuming that players have different beliefs about the recognition process. I show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game might involve inefficient delays. I also sh...

I study a noncooperative multilateral bargaining game of coalition formation, based on underlying TU games in partition form, in which coalitions are allowed to renegotiate agreements. Special attention is devoted to the strategic considerations induced by the possibility of renegotiation and its consequences for the efficiency of bargaining. I deÞne a class of games, relative positive and rela...

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent, and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of repeated large Bayesian ...

We brie‡y review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise due to exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by disc...