A model for optimal consumption and investment is posed whose solution is provided by the classical Merton analysis when there is zero transaction cost. A probabilistic argument is developed to identify the loss in value when a proportional transaction cost is introduced. There are two sources of this loss. The first is a loss due to “displacement” that arises because one cannot maintain the op...

Copyright: © 2016 INFORMS Abstract. Convex duality for two different super-replication problems in a continuous time financial market with proportional transaction cost is proved. In this market, static hedging in a finite number of options, in addition to usual dynamic hedging with the underlying stock, are allowed. The first one of the problems considered is the modelindependent hedging that ...

Standard literature concludes that transaction costs only have a second-order effect on liquidity premia. We show that this conclusion depends crucially on the assumption of a constant investment opportunity set. In a regime-switching model in which the investment opportunity set varies over time, we explicitly characterize the optimal consumption and investment strategy. In contrast to the sta...

Electronic money, in general, is used for trading over electronic channels such as the Internet, or mobile networks. Micropayments, in particular, can be used for the purchase of low value intangible goods (i.e., nonphysical assets like data and information). For these products, the use of payment instruments like on-line credit cards tends to be more expensive than the actual product. For this...

Mechanism design provides a general paradigm for deriving legal rules and institutions that implement social objectives as equilibrium outcomes of interactions among strategic individuals with private information and endogenous transaction costs. This paper designs mechanisms that generalize Ronald Coase’s farmer-rancher example of nuisance law from his seminal article, “The Problem of Social C...

The paper studies bilateral contracting with endogenous property rights. Players engage in costly ex post adjustment of ex ante contract. After ex ante agreement on surplus sharing, players invest irreversibly production. Player costs of altering ex ante contract are transaction costs of three kinds: measurement, information and enforcement costs. Each player chooses an action which incurs tran...

This paper tries to reconcile incentive theory with transaction costs theory. We first discuss the fundamental assumptions underlying the use of the Revelation Principle in the standard mechanism design literature and show how various contractual incompletenesses and externalities induced by transaction costs affect the basic trade-off between allocative efficiency and informational rents highl...

Using transaction costs theory this paper argues that transaction costs are almost as significant as production costs when it comes to offshore outsourcing and, moreover, that it is in the field of transaction costs where China has been unable to compete with India in the supply of information technology outsourcing. The paper outlines a framework for analysing transaction costs and uses the fr...