We introduce marginal worth vectors and quasi-supermodular games on convex geometries. Furthermore, we study some properties of the minimal marginal operator and the maximal marginal operator on the space of the games on convex geometries. 1991 Mathematics Subject Classi...cation: 90D12

In this paper, we consider the relationship between supermodularity and risk aversion. We show that supermodularity of the certainty equivalent implies that the certainty equivalent of any random variable is less than its mean. We also derive conditions under which supermodularity of the certainty equivalent is equivalent to aversion to mean-preserving spreads in the sense of Rothschild and Sti...

We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent to the notion of quasisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and Shannon. We conclude that supermodularity is a weak property, in the sense that many preferences have a supermodular representation.

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses to every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide econo...

In this paper, I analyze a general equilibrium on-the-job search model with endogenous search intensity and heterogenous workers and firms. Wages are set through bargaining as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). I provide proof of existence and uniqueness of steady state equilibrium. Given equally efficient search on and off the job, I provide proof that the equilibrium firm productivity ...

We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individuals’ skills is private, utilities are strictly increasing in the partner’s skill and satisfy increasing differences. Skills can be either revealed or kept hidden, but while agents on one side have verifiable skills, agents on the other side have skills that are unverifiable unless certified,...