A uctions have become enormously popular in recent years. Governments are now especially keen, using auctions to sell mobile-phone licenses, operate decentralized electricity markets, privatize companies and for many other purposes. The growth of e-commerce has led to many business-tobusiness auctions for goods whose trade was previously negotiated bilaterally. Economists are proud of their rol...

Allocative inefficiencies in online auction markets can result in the loss of revenues for sellers. It can also cause frustration for buyers who fail to win an item despite placing bids higher than other winners. The main contention of this work is that allocative inefficiencies present arbitrage opportunities, though not strictly in the traditional financial market sense, where risk-free profi...

Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a new concept proposed by the radio spectrum policy group in order to optimize usage: Mobile Network Operator (MNO) can access temporarily other incumbent's after obtaining license. The licensing process made via an auction mechanism. mechanisms literature for LSA context are one-shot which allocate all available as unique block. In this paper, we first show how ...

This paper is concerned with the merits of employing market forces to address the issues of wireless spectrum congestion and the allocation of spectrum between firms seeking licensed and unlicensed spectrum rights. We show that when unlicensed spectrum is assigned to all competing users during periods of excess demand an inefficient outcome related to the ‘‘Tragedy of the Commons” is likely to ...

We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. This pricing difference creates stronger incentives for bid shading under LAB. Wh...

The Federal Communications Commission uses an ascending bid auction called the Simultaneous Multi-round Auction (SMA) to assign spectrum for personal communication service licenses. Congress recently mandated that the SMA be evaluated to determine if it could be modified to allow “combinatorial” bids for packages of licenses. We review the theoretical background and prior experimental evidence ...

Experiments permit rigorous testing of auction theory. In single-unit private value auctions the Revenue Equivalence Theorem fails, but the comparative static predictions of Nash bidding theory hold, indicating that bidders are responsive to the primary economic forces at work in the theory. In single-unit common value auctions inexperienced bidders invariably suffer from a “winner’s curse,” an...

Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit the under-utilized radio spectrum licensed to primary users opportunistically. Market mechanism is a widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieve the efficient allocation and consumption of limited r...