In this paper, we first describe the characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are the basis of the framework of the multilateral trading system. We then provide an overview of concepts of fairness in trade agreements. Thereafter, we offer a critique of the efficiency criterion in assessing multilateral trade agreements, taking issue with T.N. Srinivasan’s (2006) analysis and t...

This paper explores the current trajectory of multilateral governance for climate change adaptation in S. Korea, which is characterised by vertical and horizontal adaptation governance. This article highlights that the characteristics of adaptation governance can be realised more effectively through grassroot activities at both metropolitan and local government levels. In particular, a thorough...

In this paper, we first describe the characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are the basis of the framework of the multilateral trading system. We then provide an overview of concepts of fairness in trade agreements. Thereafter, we offer a critique of the efficiency criterion in assessing multilateral trade agreements, taking issue with T.N. Srinivasan’s (2006) analysis and t...

We compare the well-known first-price auction with a common but previously unexamined exchange process that we term “multilateral negotiations.” In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with heterogeneous costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price concessions. Using experimental methods, we find that tra...

The funding of global public goods, such as climate mitigation and biodiversity conservation, presents a complex strategic problem. Potential recipients demand side payments for implementing projects that furnish global public goods, and donors can cooperate to provide the funding. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of this problem. In our model, a recipient demands funding for a project. Donor...

We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player can strategically choose the bargaining partners among the neighbors and buy their communication links with upfront transfers. We characterize a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria: An efficient stationary ...

This paper proposes a model for multilateral contracting, where contracts are written and renegotiated over time, and where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. Equilibria always exist and the equilibrium value function is linear and monotonically increasing on the contracts. If the grand coalition, or contracting among all agents, is inefficient we show that bargaining delays ar...

Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) make a convincing argument that traditional gravity equation estimates are biased by the omission of multilateral resistance terms. They show that these multilateral resistance terms are implicitly defined by a system of non-linear equations involving all regions’ GDP shares and a global interdependence structure involving trade costs. We show how linearizing the...

In teleoperation systems, the master robot receives force feedback from the remote slave side. Thus, the human operator can perceive the contact between the slave robot and its environment. Application of a force sensor at the slave robot improves the performance of the telepresence system in terms of transparency. Still, so far no approach allowing measured force feedback in time delayed multi...

Due to the many current weaknesses of security mechanisms in mobile technology, location based services essentially depend on security aware middleware and reliable multilateral security concepts. Neither the latest operating systems of mobile devices nor current concepts in wireless communication GPRS, WLAN, or Bluetooth meet the security requirements needed to establish sustainable trust betw...