نتایج جستجو برای: proofness
تعداد نتایج: 430 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger r...
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible goods among agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several goods to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.
We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model-where a …nite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a …nite number of individuals-to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consu...
نمودار تعداد نتایج جستجو در هر سال
با کلیک روی نمودار نتایج را به سال انتشار فیلتر کنید