The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to sender who they know trying change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches solving this puzzle: (1) some messages are easier send for those with favorable information ( costly signaling), (2) the and have common interest, (3) verifiable information, (4) cares about reputation competence/honesty, (5) ca...

A sender designs a signal about the state of world to persuade receiver. Under standard assumptions, an optimal censors states on one side cutoff and reveals all other states. This result holds in continuous discrete environments with general monotone partitional signals. The optimally more information if she is biased, certain receiver's preferences, receiver easier persuade. We apply our resu...

2590 Suppose one person, call him Sender, wishes to persuade another, call her Receiver, to change her action. If Receiver is a rational Bayesian, can Sender persuade her to take an action he would prefer over the action she was originally going to take? If Receiver understands that Sender chose what information to convey with the intent of manipulating her action for his own benefit, can Sende...

We here discuss a model of continuous opinion dynamics in which agents adjust continuous opinions as a result of random binary encounters whenever their difference in opinion is below a given threshold. We concentrate on the version of the model in the presence of few extremists which might drive the dynamics to generalized extremism. A network version of the dynamics is presented here, and its...

We study a persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, Sender might choose to use ambiguous communication devices. The main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We character...