The purpose of this paper is to explore a new deontic operator for representing what an agent ought to do; the operator is cast against the background of a modal treatment of action developed by Nuel Belnap and Michael Perlo , which itself relies on Arthur Prior's indeterministic tense logic. The analysis developed here of what an agent ought to do is based on a dominance ordering adapted from ...

The purpose of this paper is to explore a new deontic operator for representing what an agent ought to do; the operator is cast against the background of a modal treatment of action developed by Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff, which itself relies on Arthur Prior's indeterministic tense logic. The analysis developed here of what an agent ought to do is based on a dominance ordering adapted from...

Are inferences, theoretical and practical, subject to requirements of rationality? If so, are these of the form ‘if ... ought ...’, or ‘ought ... if ...’? If the latter, how are we to understand the ‘if’? It seems that, in all cases, we get unintuitive implications if ‘ought’ connotes having reason. It is difficult to formulate such requirements, and obscure what they explain. There might also ...

The current research examines the effect that framing persuasive messages in terms of self-guides (ideal vs. ought) has on the attitudes and cognitive responses of individuals with chronic ideal versus ought self-guides. The strength of participants' ideal and ought self-guides and the magnitude of participants' ideal and ought self-discrepancies were measured using a computerized reaction time...

I approached the symposium with a bit of trepidation. The fact is that I don’t have a theory of interaction design. Nor do I have a firm idea of its foundations, or how they ought to be structured. On the other hand, as an interaction designer, I do have a clear (if, perhaps idiosyncratic) vision of what interaction design is and of how I go about conducting my work. And I have firm beliefs on ...

Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for ‘ought’. The ...