We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which, given an order of players, the first n− 1 players sequentially announce their reservation price. Once these prices are given, the last player may choose a coalition to cooperate with, and pay each member of this coalition his reservation price. The only expected final equilibrium payoff is a new solution concept, the “selective value”, which can ...

We consider the following stochastic optimization problem first introduced by Chen et al. in [7]. We are given a vertex set of a random graph where each possible edge is present with probability pe. We do not know which edges are actually present unless we scan/probe an edge. However whenever we probe an edge and find it to be present, we are constrained to picking the edge and both its end poi...

Loan commitments represent more than 82 percent of all commercial and industrial loans by domestic banks. This paper develops a valuation model for loan commitments incorporating early exercise, multiple fees, partial exercise and credit risk. The model is analytically tractable and easy to implement. Using a sample of commercial paper backup credit lines from the Dealscan database, we show tha...

We present a new definition of computationally binding commitment schemes in the quantum setting, which we call “collapse-binding”. The definition applies to string commitments, composes in parallel, and works well with rewindingbased proofs. We give simple constructions of collapse-binding commitments in the random oracle model, giving evidence that they can be realized from hash functions lik...