-In this study, it is discussed about the mutual fund knowledge and awareness among the investors with a special reference to Chennai city. It is difficult to selective group the investors in a sample as such the population of Chennai city is large in number. Compared to earlier days the investment options are changing from risk free to riskier investments. The analyses also shows that compared...

This paper examines the equilibrium consequences of strategic behavior of mutual fund managers who withhold information about their funds and their managerial ability. We show that under this information asymmetry, low skills in the industry can result in a growth of passive management. A separating equilibrium in which skilled managers actively manage funds arises only if their compensation de...

We generalize the standard competitive rational expectations equilibrium (Hellwig (1980), Verrecchia (1982)) by studying the possibility that informed agents open mutual funds in order to sell their private information. We illustrate how mutual funds endogenously arise in equilibrium and we characterize the fund managers’ optimal investment management fees under imperfect competition. In our mo...

The mutual fund industry has experienced huge growth internationally, becoming one of the primary vehicles through which individuals and most institutions invest in capital markets. Thus, the evaluation of the performance of mutual funds has become a very interesting research topic both for academic researchers for managers of financial, banking and investment institutions. This paper proposes ...

This paper tests the alternative hypotheses of investment selection skills versus overconfidence of fund managers among equity mutual funds in Taiwan. We find a positive relation between fund holdings’ concentration level and risk-adjusted fund performance in the bull market, but a negative relation in the bear markets. The time varying concentration-performance relation is not driven by the fu...

This paper documents the tendency of mutual fund managers to follow analyst recommendation revisions when they trade stocks, and the impact of analyst revisioninduced mutual fund “herds” on stock prices. We find that mutual fund herds follow consensus revisions in analyst recommendations, controlling for common investment signals that affect both analyst revisions and mutual fund trading. Conse...

The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we show that mutual fund theorems hold when minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin (that is, wealth reaching zero before death), as they do when maximizing the utility of consumption (Merton, 1971). Bayraktar and Young (2007a) determine when the investment strategies are identical under the two problems of maximizing utility of consumption...