The relation of self-understanding and moral judgment to dedicated prosocial behavior is investigated. Participants were African-American and Latin-American adolescents who had been nominated by community leaders for having demonstrated unusual commitments to care for others or the community (care exemplars). The care exemplars, and matched comparison adolescents, were extensively interviewed o...

It has sometimes been suggested that people represent the structure of action in terms of an action tree. A question now arises about the relationship between this action tree representation and people's moral judgments. A natural hypothesis would be that people first construct a representation of the action tree and then go on to use this representation in making moral judgments. The present p...

Recent empirical research seems to show that emotions play a substantial role in moral judgment. Perhaps the most important line of support for this claim focuses on disgust. A number of philosophers and scientists argue that there is adequate evidence showing that disgust significantly influences various moral judgments. And this has been used to support or undermine a range of philosophical t...

Safety critical systems can cause injury or death to people if they malfunction, and thus it is of vital importance for employees to report bugs in such systems. Based on the notions of moral intensity and morality judgment, we propose a model that explains employees’ intentions to report bugs in safety critical systems. We conducted a conjoint experiment to test the model. Based on data from 1...

While a considerable amount of research is done in the field of moral psychology, to our best knowledge, no systematic study of moral judgments made by professional groups who make moral decisions as part of their occupational duties exists (e.g. firefighters, medical doctors, midwives, police officers). By their training and practice, such professionals are expected to exhibit differences in m...

Lippe rejected out of hand the idea advanced by Morris [5] that pain was a pluralistic concept. Rather, he asserted “the biomedical basis of maldynia.” In Lippe’s medicocentric view of pain, “maldynia” was neither a symptom nor a syndrome but an “illness with endogenous and exogenous components.” Thus defined, “eudynia” becomes a teleologically beneficial mechanism, whereas “maldynia” is “usele...