We find significant relations between active mutual fund portfolio holdings and executive compensation, which appear to be largely driven by mutual fund investment styles rather than monitoring behaviour. Aggressive growth fund holdings are associated with performance pay, while income fund holdings are negatively related. We also find that mutual fund holdings are insensitive to changes in exe...

In this paper, we suggest that ine±ciency may be an indirect, onthe-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-o®s between di®erent ine±ciencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.

I broadly explore the question by examining several common criticisms of CEO pay through both philosophical and empirical lenses. While some criticisms appear to be unfounded, the analysis shows not only that current compensation practices are problematic both from the standpoint of distributive justice and fairness, but also that incentive pay ultimately exacerbates the very agency problem it ...

The compensation structure plays an important role in a company's non-employee employees. includes employee's base salary and other incentives. Compensation incentives can make non-employees work harder bring more profits to the company. But after my research not all cases are valid. In word, according data we have obtained so far, conclusion be drawn that incentive plan of non-Employee directo...

Scoring rules for eliciting expert predictions of random variables are usually developed assuming that experts derive utility only from the quality of their predictions (e.g., score awarded by the rule, or payoff in a prediction market). We study a more realistic setting in which (a) the principal is a decision maker and will take a decision based on the expert’s prediction; and (b) the expert ...

We present a novel approach to wireless fair scheduling in a distributed architecture. Our scheme is based on a simple extension of wireline fair scheduling by compensation for lost capacity after the losses occur. In addition, the scheduler can give limited compensation for unused capacity. This provides an incentive for users of the location-dependent wireless channel to optimize their channe...

When working together, people engage in non-contractual and informal interactions that constitute the sociology of the group. We use behavioral models and a unique survey of medical groups to analyze how group sociology influences physician incentive pay and behavior. We conclude that informal interactions among group members influence pay practices and behaviors, but the relationship is comple...

* We are grateful to Ulf Schiller for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank Yanruo Wang for excellent research assistance. Agency theory has for most part focused on the nature and efficiency properties of " complete " incentive contracts. Accordingly, a contract is viewed as a collection of " if-then " statements such that a specific payoff results if a particular...

Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That ...

Both authors contributed equally to the paper. The helpful comments of Jerry Davis, Paul Hirsch, Matt Kraatz, Marshall Meyer, Brian Uzzi, three anonymous ASO reviewers, and seminar participants at MIT and Stanford University are appreciated. We also thank Rodger Voorhies and Ann Yoo for assistance in data collection, and Linda Pike for her valuable editorial advice. While current debates about ...