In conversations between native speakers, words such as ‘same’ and ‘identical’ do not usually cause much difficulty. We take it for granted that others use them with the same sense as we do. If it is unclear whether numerical or qualitative identity is intended, a brief gloss such as ‘one thing not two’ for the former or ‘exactly alike’ for the latter removes the unclarity. In this paper, numer...

We nave implemented a restricted .:lommn parser called Plume "M Building on previous work at Carneg=e-Mellon Unfvers=ty e.g. [4, 5. 81. Plume s approacn to oars=ng ~s based on semantic caseframe mstant~a~on Th~s nas the advantages of effic=ency on g r i n ~at ical ,nput. and robustness in the face of ungrammatmcal tnput Wh~le Plume ~s well adapted to s=mpte ,:;~ectaratwe and ~mperat=ve utteranc...

by John Dilworth Philo 6 no. 1 (2003), pp. 216-234. Abstract: There are no unicorns, but there are representations of them, hence motivating an explanation of discourse about the property 'unicorn' in terms of discourse about representations of unicorns. I show how to extend this strategy to apply to any kind or property terms. References to property instances may be explained as references to ...

Since its introduction by Evans (1982), the generality constraint (GC) has been invoked by various philosophers for different purposes. Our purpose here is, first, to clarify what precisely the GC states by way of an interpretive framework, the GC Schema, and second, to demonstrate in terms of this framework some problems that arise if one invokes the GC (or systematicity) without clearly speci...

Since its introduction by Evans (1982), the generality constraint (GC) has been invoked by various philosophers for different purposes. Our purpose here is, first, to clarify what precisely the GC states by way of an interpretive framework, the GC Schema, and second, to demonstrate in terms of this framework some problems that arise if one invokes the GC (or systematicity) without clearly speci...