This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Σ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Σ . The Σ-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions,...

We study non-binding procurement auctions where both price and nonprice characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. The outcome of such auctions critically depends on how information is distributed among bidders during the bidding process. As we show theoretically, whether it is in the buyer’s interest to disclose or to conceal non-price information depends on the precise re...

Online markets play an important role for both online sellers and online buyers. Previous research has identified problems of information asymmetry in the online used goods markets, this research explore whether there are similar problems in the new-goods online markets. Grounded in “lemon market” theory, this study used panel data captured from eBay Motors. Employing Ordinary Least Squares ana...

The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We prove the existence of an increasing equilibrium, and study the comparative statics of correlation in the k-double auction with affiliated private values. This is supposedly the simplest bilateral trading mechanism that allows for dependence in valuations between buyers and sellers. In the case k ∈{0 ,1} ...

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain an...

This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to a.liated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government o.shore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that e.cient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments. In the latter case, fear of the winner’s curse ...

In e-commerce, Business-to-Business (B2B) interactions, like e.g., electronic negotiations and auctions between suppliers and customers, could be significantly improved by enabling their participants to adapt their negotiation and bidding strategies to current logistics information (e.g., about estimated transportation cost) while the interaction goes on. In this paper, we present an agent-base...

The concept of cognitive radio is emerging as a platform for designing next generation wireless networks with dynamic resource sharing among machines. However, how to efficiently and fairly share the spare channels is still a topic under intensive research. This paper investigates a spectrum trading problem under relatively realistic settings, where heterogeneous channels under buyers’ budget c...

This paper presents a revenue maximisation model for sales channel allocation based on dynamic programming. It helps the media seller to determine how to distribute the sales volume of page views between guaranteed and nonguaranteed channels for display advertising. The model can algorithmically allocate and price the future page views via standardised guaranteed contracts in addition to real-t...

This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to a¢ liated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government o¤shore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that e¢ cient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments. In the latter case, fear of the winner’s curs...