Formal methods, theory, and supporting tools can aid the design, analysis, and verification of the security-related and cryptographic protocols used over open networks and distributed systems. The most commonly followed techniques for the application of formal methods for the ex-post analysis and verification of cryptographic protocols, as the analysis approach, are reviewed, followed by the ex...

Formal methods, theory, and supporting tools can aid the design, analysis, and verification of the security-related and cryptographic protocols used over open networks and distributed systems. The most commonly followed techniques for the application of formal methods for the ex-post analysis and verification of cryptographic protocols, as the analysis approach, are reviewed, followed by the ex...

We demonstrate how to carry out cryptographic security analysis of distributed protocols within the Probabilistic I/O Automata framework of Lynch, Segala, and Vaandrager. This framework provides tools for arguing rigorously about the concurrency and scheduling aspects of protocols, and about protocols presented at different levels of abstraction. Consequently, it can help in making cryptographi...

FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL Joe-Kai Tsay Andre Scedrov, Advisor The security of cryptographic protocols has traditionally been verified with respect to one of two mathematical models: One, known as the Dolev-Yao or symbolic model, abstracts cryptographic concepts into an algebra of symbolic messages. Methods based on the Dolev-Yao abstraction, which make use of simpl...

2. The network model is too detailed. The traditional model of the network as an opponent in cryptographic protocols enables the opponent to forge, alter and remove messages. In contrast, the basic protocols underlying, say, identity management frameworks assume integrity of messages. This greater abstraction permits the users and architects of Web 2.0 components to focus on semantic issues, su...

Various published authentication protocols that employ symmetric cryptographic algorithms are examined. A number of misconceptions found in the speciication, design and implementation of these protocols are revealed. Some misconceptions are considered responsible for deenite security aws, while others are shown to cause weaknesses which may help in attacks on the cryptographic mechanisms. We id...

Cryptographic two-party protocols are used ubiquitously in everyday life. While some of these protocols are easy to understand and implement (e.g., key exchange or transmission of encrypted data), many of them are much more complex (e.g., ebanking and e-voting applications, or anonymous authentication and credential systems). For a software engineer without appropriate cryptographic skills the ...

It is well-known that most cryptographic tasks do not have universally composable (UC) secure protocols, if no trusted setup is available in the framework. On the other hand, if a task like fair coin-tossing is available as a trusted setup, then all cryptographic tasks have UCsecure protocols. What other trusted setups allow UC-secure protocols for all tasks? More generally, given a particular ...

Security and safety were and still are a major concern for distributed computing systems and similar networks of computer environments. A number of cryptographic protocols have been proposed to achieve security and safety of network communication. There is growing interest in using computer simulation to help with understanding, analysing and designing of dynamic complex real systems. This pape...

We demonstrate how to carry out cryptographic security analysis of distributed protocols within the Probabilistic I/O Automata framework of Lynch, Segala, and Vaandrager. This framework provides tools for arguing rigorously about the concurrency and scheduling aspects of protocols, and about protocols presented at different levels of abstraction. Consequently, it can help in making cryptographi...