This paper considers a cryptanalytic approach called integral cryptanalysis. It can be seen as a dual to differential cryptanalysis and applies to ciphers not vulnerable to differential attacks. The method is particularly applicable to block ciphers which use bijective components only.

In 1,2] we introduced the notion of diierential cryptanalysis and described its application to DESS11] and several of its variants. In this paper we show the applicability of diierential cryptanalysis to the Feal family of encryption algorithms and to the N-Hash hash function. In addition, we show how to transform diierential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attacks into known plaintext attacks.

In [1,2] we introduced the notion of differential cryptanalysis and described its application to DES[8] and several of its variants. In this paper we show the applicability of differential cryptanalysis to the Feal family of encryption algorithms and to the N-Hash hash function.

This paper introduces a more in-depth cryptanalysis framework for tweakable cryptosystems than Cube Attack, Cube Tester, algebraic IV differential attack (AIDA), and higher order differential cryptanalysis in Boolean algebra. Through the view of the new framework, the differences among these existing analysis methods are clarified. Furthermore, a principle is proposed to design secure systems a...

We describe Constraint Programming (CP) models to solve a cryptanalytic problem: the chosen key differential attack against the standard block cipher AES. We show that CP solvers are able to solve these problems quicker than dedicated cryptanalysis tools, and we prove that a solution claimed to be optimal in two recent cryptanalysis papers is not optimal by providing a better solution.

In this investigation, we have developed a novel block cipher by modifying classical Feistel cipher. In this, we have used a key bunched wherein each key has a multiplicative inverse. The cryptanalysis carried out in this investigation clearly shows that this cipher cannot be broken by any attack. Keywords-encryption; decryption; cryptanalysis; avalanche effect; multiplicative inverse.

In this paper, we examine the security of the class of substitution-permutation private-key block ciphers with respect to linear and diierential crypt-analysis. A new S-box nonlinearity criterion is proposed and it is shown that S-boxes satisfying this criterion and having good diiusion improve remarkably the ability of an SPN to resist linear cryptanalysis and diierential cryptanalysis.

MARS’s s-boxes were generated using a new algorithm developed by the IBM team, which was supposedly able of producing secure s-boxes against both differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper we show this is not the case, because their strength against linear cryptanalysis is not better (in fact, it seems to be worse) that what could be expected if generated randomly.