نتایج جستجو برای: combinatorial auctions

تعداد نتایج: 48897  

2002
Renata Mansini M. Grazia Speranza

In recent times combinatorial auctions have become an interesting domain for theoretical and applied developments of the electronic market technology. A combinatorial auction allows the simultaneous selling of several items and each participant to the auction may bid for bundles of items. When items in a bid are all different the auction is said a Single Unit Combinatorial Auction (SUCA), while...

2015
NIKHIL DEVANUR VASILIS SYRGKANIS MATTHEW WEINBERG Nikhil Devanur Jamie Morgenstern Vasilis Syrgkanis

We introduce single-bid auctions as a new format for combinatorial auctions. In single-bid auctions, each bidder submits a single real-valued bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. Contrary to other simple auction formats, such as simultaneous or sequential single-item auctions, bidders can implement no-regret learning strategies for single-bid auctions in polynomial time. Price of an...

2003
Gediminas Adomavicius Alok Gupta

Many auctions involve selling several distinct items simultaneously, where bidders can bid on the whole or any part of the lot. Such auctions are referred to as combinatorial auctions. Examples of such auctions include truck delivery routes, furniture, and FCC spectrum. Determining winners in such auctions is an NP-complete problem and significant research is being conducted in this area. Howev...

2001
Justin Boyan Amy Greenwald

Suppose you want to buy a used Canon AE-1 SLR camera and ash at an on-line auction. At last count, over 4000 links to on-line auction sites were available at advocacy-net.com. It would be quite a daunting task to manually monitor prices and make bidding decisions at all sites currently o ering the camera|especially if the ash accessory is sometimes bundled with the camera, and sometimes auction...

2001
David Christopher Parkes Lyle H. Ungar

ITERATIVE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS: ACHIEVING ECONOMIC AND COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY David Christopher Parkes Supervisor: Lyle H. Ungar This thesis presents new auction-based mechanisms to coordinate systems of selfinterested and autonomous agents, and new methods to design such mechanisms and prove their optimality. Computation is increasingly carried out on open networks, with self-interested pr...

2011
Boris Mikhaylov Jesús Cerquides Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar

Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to supply chain formation, we must ensure computational tractability and reduce bidders’ uncertainty. With this aim, we introduce Sequential Mixed Auctions (SMAs), a novel auction model concei...

2007
Stefan Schneider Pasha Shabalin Martin Bichler

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favouring iterative combinatorial auction designs. Several promising ascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual algorithms and linear programming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional a...

Farhad Ghassemi-Tari Reza Alaei

Commercial advertising is the main source of income for TV channels and allocation of advertising time slots for maximizing broadcasting revenues is the major problem faced by TV channel planners. In this paper, the problem of scheduling advertisements on prime-time of a TV channel is considered. The problem is formulated as a multi-unit combinatorial auction based mathematical model. This is a...

2016
Maria-Florina Balcan Tuomas Sandholm Ellen Vitercik

The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the traditional economic models, it is assumed that the bidders’ valuations are drawn from an underlying distribution and that the auction designer has perfect knowled...

2009
Gediminas Adomavicius Shawn P. Curley Alok Gupta Pallab Sanyal

Combinatorial auctions – in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods – have been shown to increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities. However, the computational complexity of determining winners coupled with the cognitive complexity of formulating combinatorial bids has prevented this mechanism from reaching the online marketplace. Drawing from recent re...

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