This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. JEL classifications: C72, D82.

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. JEL Classification: C72, D85

Winning strategies in PQ PENNY FLIP are quantum mechanical in exactly the way quantum algorithms are. 1998 Physics and Astronomy Classi cation Scheme: 03.67.Lx, 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le. American Mathematical Society Subject Classi cation: 81P15, 90D05. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation System: C72.

We show that the folk theorem generically holds for N -player repeated games with private monitoring when each player’s number of signals is su¢ ciently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: C72, C73, D82

The extent of genetic diversity in food crops is important as it affects the risk of attack by pathogens. A drop in diversity increases this risk. Farmers may not take this into account when making crop choices, leading to what from a social perspective is an inadequate level of diversity. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: Q1; Q2; C72

Virulence factors (VFs) contribute to the emergence of new human Mycobacterium tuberculosis strains, are lineage dependent, and are relevant to the development of M. tuberculosis drugs/vaccines. VFs were sought within M. tuberculosis lineage 3, which has the Central Asian (CAS) spoligotype. Three isolates were selected from clusters previously identified as dominant in London, United Kingdom. S...

We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is su¢ cient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses). Keywords: Envy, Pride, Wages, Prizes, Bonus JEL Classi…cation: C72, D01, D23, L14.

This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties’preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payo¤ to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator. JEL classi…cation: C72, D82, D83

This paper further studies a model of information elicitation due to Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz [13], where the introduction of sequential mechanisms results in more efficiency than the classical simultaneous mechanism design approach entails. Whereas the original work focused on anonymous function and settings where information is distributed independently across agents we extend the results ...

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch’s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core (Kóczy, 2007). Subject classification: C71, C72