This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel & Moldovanu (1995a) by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer ...

This paper analyzes the e¤ects of buyer and seller risk aversion in …rst and secondprice auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller’s optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the …rst-p...

This article explores the development of sales tax on e-business. It points out that the problem was rooted in the fact that the seller is required to collect and remit the tax to the buyer’s state government. If the seller and the buyer do not reside in the same state, the buyer’s state government has no jurisdiction over the seller, unless there is a “physical presence” of the seller in the b...

We deal with the pricing of callable Russian options. A callable Russian option is a contract in which both of the seller and the buyer have the rights to cancel and to exercise at any time, respectively. The pricing of such an option can be formulated as an optimal stopping problem between the seller and the buyer, and is analyzed as Dynkin game. We derive the value function of callable Russia...

This paper explores the interplay between choice of investment type (speci…c vs. general), bargaining extensive form and endogenous outside options in the framework of incomplete contracts introduced formally in the work of Grossman, Hart and Moore. We …nd that the bargaining procedure chosen has signi…cant implications for choice of investment and for the usefulness of the assignment of proper...

This paper analyzes the e¤ects of buyer and seller risk aversion in …rst and secondprice auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller’s optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the …rst-p...

A two period bargaining model with asymmetric information is considered. An uninformed seller charges a uniform price to two buyers. A risk averse seller offers a larger price cut in period two when one buyer remains in the market than when two buyers remain. The price in period one is sensitive to the number of buyers and the seller’s degree of risk aversion. The initial price charged to a sin...

We investigate a model in which one seller and one buyer trade in each of two periods. The buyer has demand for one unit of a non-durable object per period. The buyer’s reservation value for the good is private information and is the same in both periods. The seller commits to prices in each of two periods. Prices in the second period may depend on the buyer’s first-period behavior. Unlike the ...

This paper studies the optimality of securitized debt when information acquisition is endogenous and exible. A seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity. Rather than treating the seller as an insider endowed with information, we assume no information asymmetry before bargaining. The buyer has an expertise in acquiring information of the f...

Name-Your-Own-Price is a popular interactive pricing mechanism in Electronic Commerce that lets both, buyer and seller, influence the price of a product. At the outset, a seller defines a secret threshold price indicating the minimum price he is willing to sell the product for. Subsequently, a buyer is asked to place a bid indicating her willingness-to-pay for the product offered. If the bid va...