We study the problem of testing identity against a given distribution (a.k.a. goodness-of-fit) with a focus on the high confidence regime. More precisely, given samples from an unknown distribution p over n elements, an explicitly given distribution q, and parameters 0 < ε, δ < 1, we wish to distinguish, with probability at least 1 − δ, whether the distributions are identical versus ε-far in to...

Since the time of Descartes, various versions a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. However, more new criticism has surfaced, viz., an contingent physicalism. The purpose this article show what I take be sophisticated physicalist fails as defeater argument. A...

Larry Hardin has been the most steadfast and influential critic of physicalist theories of color over the last 20 years. In their modern form these theories originated with the work of Smart and Armstrong in the 1960s and 1970s 1 and Hardin appropriately concentrated on their views in his initial critique of physicalism. 2 In his most recent contribution to this project 3 he attacks Michael Tye...

In a recent paper, Shapiro and Sober (2007) defend two claims with respect to the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is designed to rebut non-reductive physicalism: (i) relative to an interventionist account of causation, as most elaborately presented in (Woodward 2003), the master argument turns out to be invalid; and (ii) interventionism provides a means to experimentally uncover mic...

Paul Churchland argues that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism is so strong that if it defeated physicalism it would, at the same time, defeat ‘substance dualism’. The purpose of this paper is to articulate this ‘parity of reasons’ objection. In the first part of the paper, I discuss Churchland’s argument. I demonstrate that although his formulation of the objection is not w...

Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks t...