We propose a bargaining process as a way of playing and solving non cooperative games. We focus on social dilemma situations and show that sequential proposals which, if confirmed by players, determine real play, may give rise to equilibrium outcomes which differ from the standard non cooperative solution. Specifically, we show that, under standard assumptions, in a prisoners’ dilemma with conf...

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one– sided early commitment power the “proposer” gets (nearly) the whole pie while the “responder” is left with (almost) nothing. When both parties commit simultaneously the (a)symmetric Nash(1950)–bargaining solution, however, predicts (more or less) equal shares. Relying on a continuous connection of these two games b...

We study the asymptotic properties of the Shapley value of patent licensing games with the Cournot competition, shedding light on its relations to the nucleolus, core and bargaining set. The Shapley value of the outside patentee of a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation converges to 2(a − c), which coincides with the patentee’s profit through non-cooperative licensing by means of upfront fee (o...

We study Kantian equilibria of an n $n$ -player bargaining game, which is a modified version the well-known divide-the-dollar game. first show that equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment equals, and almost nowhere proportional, then only division can prevail in any equilibrium. On other hand, we “anything goes” type result ...