For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the present paper presents a more complete theory that expa...

The problem of mapping tasks onto a computational grid with the aim to minimize the power consumption and the makespan subject to the constraints of deadlines and architectural requirements is considered in this paper. To solve this problem, we propose a solution from cooperative game theory based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution. The proposed game theoretical technique is compared ag...

This experimental study investigates two bargaining games with twosided incomplete information between a seller and a buyer. In the first game with no outside options many subjects do not use the incomplete information to their advantage as predicted. We find that a model with adjusting priors better explains observed behavior. The second game gives the buyer the option to buy via search or ret...

This paper analyzes a model of bilateral bargaining in the presence of information flow revealing one’s bargaining posture. The equilibrium outcome of our bargaining game converges to that of the unique equilibrium of its a continuous-time limit, as players can make offers arbitrarily frequently. We characterize the equilibrium of this limiting game and develop some comparative statics regardin...

This paper presents a behavior model of large repeated Bayesian games with an unknown number of players n, correlated types and imperfect monitoring. Each of the n players behaves as if she is negligible in a continuum game, but the game theorist performs a complete Bayesian analysis of what happens with such n players in the real repeated interaction. In addition to performing correct analysis...

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter’s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disp...

We establish a general n-player link between non-cooperative bargaining and the Nash solution. Non-cooperative bargaining is captured in a reduced form through the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stability concept. A stable set always exists. Moreover, if the utility set has a smooth surface, then any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, the equivalence of stationary eq...

The objective of this research is to tackle bargaining problems with Evolutionary Algorithms (EA). EA have been proved effective for a wide variety of problems. In this paper, we apply EA to solve Rubinstein’s Basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining Problem whose game-theoretic solution is known. Experimental outcomes suggest that EA are able to generate convincing approximations of the theoretic so...

This paper investigates whether ’tough’ bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. These results differ drastically from those of Ellingsen’s model (Ellingsen (1997)), where bargaining is efficient. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evo...

We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately imp...