Under what circumstances will an auctioneer be better off selling his inventory sequentially, rather than selling them all in a single auction? If bidders come sequentially, there is an obvious reason to sell items sequentially. However, even when all bidders present at the beginning of the auction, and both the auctioneer and bidders are impatient, we show that a sequential auction can still b...

Internet auctions for consumers are among the lnost popular and lnost successful business models in electronic COlnmerce. Research so far, however, has focused on prerequisites and consequences of auctions as a marketing instrument of suppliers. Even though it is a key success factor from a lnarketing perspective, the delnand side has not inspired sünilar attention. This paper focuses on the at...

The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first...

We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants’ valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry maximizes the expected revenue. Furthe...

While efficient price discovery is crucial, there is another equally important attribute of markets that merits consideration, namely liquidity. Efficient prices, after all, are unimportant if one can transact only a 100-share lot at these prices. Liquidity was historically provided by dealers who buy or sell securities on demand. In the past, where communication links were poor and buyers and ...

NegotiAuction, a computer system which combines aspects of auctions and negotiations, is expected to overcome limitations in online reverse auctions and multi-attribute online reverse auctions. However, no studies have been conducted to investigate its possible adoption. This study has drawn on an extensive review of literature on theories about innovation adoption, and has proposed a conceptua...

The current study offers an insight into how auction ending rules can affect distribution online bidders’ strategies. While traditional wisdom in this area suggested that auction ending rules can encourage and suppress certain bidding behaviors, limited efforts have been taken to investigate how they can affect winning likelihood and price premium distribution across different bidding strategie...

We consider an auction setting in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. We establish a distinction between price externalities that do not depend on the identity of the winner and price externalitie...