We study a repeated principal-agent interaction, in which the principal offers a "spot" wage contract at every period, and the agent’s outside option follows a Markov process with  shocks. If the agent rejects an offer, the two parties are permanently separated. At any period during the relationship, the agent is productive if and only if his wage does not fall below a "reference point" (b...

We describe an incremental algorithm to enumerate the isomorphism classes of double pseudoline arrangements. The correction of our algorithm is based on the connectedness under mutations of the spaces of one-extensions of double pseudoline arrangements, proved in this paper. Counting results derived from an implementation of our algorithm are also reported.

Issues By Sandy Dunn, Director, Assetivity Please request permission from the author before copying or distributing this article There are a number of issues facing organisations that are considering maintenance outsourcing as an improvement initiative. Amongst these are the following: To outsource or not outsource strategic decision making Does a competitive outsourcing market exist? How much ...

This paper considers transactions involving Prisoners’ Dilemmas with an outside option. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game no interaction takes place. Since there is no official legal system of contract enforcement cooperation cannot be obtained. Intermediation offers adequate information and/or enforcement to crowd out defectors and to yield social optimality. An experiment ...