We investigate an IPO security design problem when information asymmetries across investors lead to a winner’s curse. Firms that are riskier in down markets can lower the cost of going public by using unit IPOs, in which equity and warrants are combined into a non-divisible package. Furthermore, firms that have a sizeable growth potential even in bad states of the world can fully eliminate the ...

The study, aimed at evaluating the likely effects of the EC Directive on late payments, provides direct evidence that interfirm credit received by Italian manufacturing firms is, if ever, only slightly more expensive than bank loans. An econometric exercise shows that financial determinants have a stronger impact on recorded credit and debt periods for larger firms, able to use trade credit to ...

This paper uses saddlepoint technique to backtest the trading risk of commercial banks using expected shortfall. It is found that four out of six US commercial banks have excessive trading risks. Monte Carlo simulation studies show that the proposed backtest is very accurate and powerful even for small test samples. More importantly, risk managers can carry out the proposed backtest based on an...

Using a unique sample of Chinese bank loans over the period 2007-2012, we analyze the repayment decisions of borrowing firms whose cash holdings are high enough to cover the maturing loans. We find that at the firm level weak legal enforcement increases the likelihood for these firms to default on its loan obligations. The impact of legal enforcement becomes stronger when firms face tighter fin...

The practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives. Our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively a!ect initial incentives, resetting can still be an important, value-enhancing aspect of compensation contracts, even from an ex-ante standpoint. In fact, we "nd that some resetting is al...

Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Studying the trade-off between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Popular all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding schemes reflect thei...

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds’ investment restrictions, and governance mechanisms influence the fund family’s decision to apply for interfund lending. We document several costs ...

We derive the optimal crowdfunding contract of a financially constrained monopolist and analyze its implications for production, investment and welfare. Crowdfunding contracts may serve as a price-discrimination mechanism, forcing pivotal consumers to pay a premium above the future spot price, thus increasing profits. When raising funds is costly, entrepreneurs balance the benefits from price d...

Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factor...

We study how equity and debt contracts commit investors to discipline managers. Our model shows that the optimal allocation of debt, equity, and control rights depends on which disciplinary action is more efficient. When the efficient action is managerial replacement, then control rights should be allocated to equity holders, and capital structure should consist of equity and long-term debt. Wh...