The paper considers the role of econometrics in decision making under uncertainty. This leads to a focus on predictive distributions. The decision maker's subjective distribution is only partly speci"ed; it belongs to a set S of distributions. S can also be regarded as a set of plausible data-generating processes. Criteria are needed to evaluate procedures for constructing predictive distributi...

We argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, decision theory is not invariant to the physical environment in which a decision is made. Specifically, we show that a decision maker (DM) with access to quantum information resources may be able to do strictly better than a DM with access only to classical information resources. In this respect, our findings are somewhat akin to those in computer...

This paper describes and evaluates a decision theory measurement model that can be used to classify examinees based on their item response patterns. The model has a simple framework that starts with the conditional probabilities of examinees in each category or mastery state responding correctly to each item. An overview of measurement decision theory and its key concepts are presented and illu...

This paper motivates the study of decision theory as necessary for aligning smarter-thanhuman artificial systems with human interests. We discuss the shortcomings of two standard formulations of decision theory, and demonstrate that they cannot be used to describe an idealized decision procedure suitable for approximation by artificial systems. We then explore the notions of policy selection an...

I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focussed on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads...

I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction lead...